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Abstract. Understanding the spread of asset bubbles is pivotal to the effectiveness of risk management. This study thus es-
timates housing bubbles and investigates how and to what extent price bubbles spread between the tiers of luxury and mass 
housing in Hong Kong. The results show that price bubbles spread between housing tiers, the spreading of bubbles is not 
uni-directional from luxury to mass tiers, and more than 60% of bubbles come from inter-tier spreading. Moreover, bubble 
shocks from the luxury tier have stronger spreading influences on the movements of bubbles in the mass housing tier than 
the other way around during the period before the end of the global financial crisis (GFC), whereas the opposite is true for 
the period after GFC. The findings are important for policy makers attempting to tackle soaring housing bubbles, financial 
institutions seeking to managing lending risk, and housing investors wanting to time the submarkets.
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Introduction
Housing price bubbles can induce a broad misallocation of 
capital and resources, influence investment decisions, and 
have profound effects on the overall economy. Price bub-
bles may result from speculative transactions in markets 
where agents have heterogeneous opinions regarding the 
values of assets (Kandel & Pearson, 1995; Morris, 1996; 
Hong et  al., 2006) and may prevail when restrictions, 
such as borrowing constraints, short-sales limitations, 
and restriction in supply, generate market imperfections, 
facilitate speculative activities, and give rise to price mo-
mentum in the housing market (Haruvy & Noussair, 2006; 
Mayer, 2011). Price bubbles may also be attributed to ex-
uberant expectations of future price movements, which 
transmit through psychological contagion (Shiller, 2005).
Similar to the formation of price bubbles, the spread 
of housing price bubbles across quality tiers does not 
have to be associated with actual homeowner activities 
of trading-up or filtering-down. Psychological contagion 
and speculative activities can also facilitate the spread of 
the bubbles across quality tiers. This might be particularly 
possible for a geographically small and densely populated 
city in which informational or psychological spreading is 
relatively easy and starts fast from any quality tier of the 
housing market.
As an effort to restrain housing bubbles, governments 
such as those of Canada, Singapore, Taiwan, and the UK 
have implemented or have considered cooling measures 
targeting their luxury housing markets (Navaratnarajah, 
2013; Taiwan Today, 2013; Ellyatt, 2014; Bourbeau & Lo-
gan, 2016). Implicitly, the cooling policies hypothesize 
that housing price bubbles could spread across quality-
tiered markets and that bubbles in mass housing mar-
kets come from bubbles in luxury housing markets in a 
uni-directional fashion. However, the relevant literature 
suggests that bubbles can start from any submarket, and 
the spread, if any, could be either from luxury markets to 
mass markets or in a reverse direction. Therefore, there is 
a clear need to conduct an empirical study on the inter-
tier spread of housing bubbles.
Considerable work has been devoted to examine 
whether housing price dynamics exhibit a spatial pattern 
that is characterized by the spread of market disturbance 
from one specific region to other regions (see, inter alia, 
Lee et  al., 2014; Tsai, 2015; Teng et al., 2017). However, 
few studies have been conducted to explore whether and 
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how housing prices spread across quality tiers. To the best 
of our knowledge, even such scant studies on the inter-
tier spread of housing prices, like Coulson and McMil-
len (2007), Damianov and Escobari (2016), Ong and Sing 
(2002), Sing et  al. (2006), Ho et  al. (2008), and Bangu-
ra and Lee (2020), have not yet examined the inter-tier 
spread of housing bubbles.1
To fill the research void, this study examines how 
housing price bubbles spread between luxury and mass 
housing tiers in the geographically small and densely pop-
ulated global city of Hong Kong. Specifically, this study 
aims to answer the following questions for the Hong Kong 
housing market: (1) Do housing price bubbles spread be-
tween luxury and mass housing tiers? (2) Is the spread-
ing uni-directional from luxury to mass tiers? (3) If the 
spreading is not uni-directional, then are bubbles in the 
mass housing tier more strongly influenced by the luxury 
housing tier than the other way around?
This study contributes to and extends the literature on 
housing prices, by investigating how housing price bub-
bles spread from one quality tier of housing market to 
others. Studies on the spread of bubbles are sparse in the 
housing literature. To our knowledge, this is the first study 
to explore the inter-tier spread of housing bubbles. The 
findings of this research have important implications not 
only to policy makers responsible for regulating housing 
markets, both in Hong Kong and other places, but also to 
local and international financial institutions and investors 
concerning risk in the Hong Kong housing market.
1. The Hong Kong market
Hong Kong is a global financial hub and located on the 
eastern side of the Pearl River estuary in southern China. 
The total area of Hong Kong is only about 1.107 km2, 
and its population density is about 6.300 people per km2 
as of 2017, making it one of the most densely populated 
places in the world (GovHK, 2019). Hong Kong was trans-
ferred from UK to China in 1997 and is now officially the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) of 
the People’s Republic of China under “One Country, Two 
Systems”.
In the same year of its handover to China, the Asian 
financial crisis broke out and resulted in the collapse of 
Hong Kong’s housing market (Leung & Tang, 2012). Partly 
due to oversupply under the 85,000-units plan,2 housing 
prices in Hong Kong plummeted consecutively until 2003, 
putting a sizable number of mortgaged homes in negative 
equity (Li, 2016a, 2016b). From March to May 2003, the 
1 The studies of the inter-tier linkage of office prices conducted 
by Leung et al. (2008) and Lee et al. (2018) also concentrated 
on the spread of price movements themselves.
2 This refers to the housing development plan targeting an an-
nual production of 85,000 housing units announced at the 
inauguration of Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa in 1997 (Li, 
2016a, 2016b). The plan was quietly shelved around the turn 
of the century (Li, 2016a).
SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) outbreak sent 
the market further into the doldrums.
From its bottom in the third quarter of 2003, Hong 
Kong’s housing market started a robust recovery propelled 
by a strong, broad-based upturn in the local economy. The 
recovery was partially attributed to the weakening Hong 
Kong currency pegged to U.S. dollars, the 10 major infra-
structure projects, and the supportive policies instituted 
by the Beijing central government (Yeung et  al., 2008; 
Li, 2016a, 2016b; Wong, 2015). In addition, the Capital 
Investment Entrant Scheme was launched to allow rea-
sonably well-off non-local people to purchase housing in 
Hong Kong in order to qualify for permanent citizenship 
(Li, 2016b). Nevertheless, the supply of residential prop-
erty remained tight due to the government’s strict control 
of land supply for new housing provision. The control was 
implemented, partly because of a fear over a repeat of the 
free falls in housing prices and strong protests for environ-
mental concerns (Leung & Tang, 2012; Li, 2016b).
Hong Kong housing prices plunged in the later part of 
2008, when the meltdown of the U.S. subprime mortgage 
market turned into international financial turbulence. 
However, the housing market bounced back very quickly 
in 2009 and has been overheating ever since (Chugani, 
2018). In addition to the record-low interest rate environ-
ment created by quantitative easing programs in the U.S. 
(Hao, 2018), mainland Chinese have been blamed for the 
bubble, noting the cross-border capital inflow brought 
by wealthy Chinese buyers that was boosted by China’s 
own stimulus package starting in November 2008 (Global 
Property Guide, 2009). Others attributed the problem to 
the massive influx of mainlanders under various entry 
arrangements,3 which led to the outstripping of demand 
over supply (Liu, 2018).
Regarding the inter-link of bubbles, one popular view 
in line with the cross-border capital inflow argument is 
that the luxury housing tier drives the mass housing tier, 
as luxury properties sold to wealthy non-local people, 
notably mainland Chinese, at staggering prices are com-
monplace and receive much media attention (Lam, 2019). 
However, the massive mainlander inflow argument sug-
gests another story, based on the observations that most 
mainlanders seeking to settle in Hong Kong are ordinary 
people (Ejinsight, 2018; Liu, 2018). Under this story, in-
sufficient housing supply could arise outside the luxury 
tier, creating price bubbles in the mass housing tier, which 
then spread upward to the luxury tier.
To rein in skyrocketing housing prices, the Hong Kong 
government has kept rolling out cooling measures, such 
as lowering loan-to-value ratios, capping maximum loan 
amounts, and levying a special stamp duty to deter specu-
3 Under the one-way permit scheme, 150 people can move to 
Hong Kong from mainland China each day (Ejinsight, 2018). 
Under other arrangements, it is estimated that around 21,000 
professionals also from mainland China could become perma-
nent residents in Hong Kong by 2019 (Liu, 2018).
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lative investment and a buyer stamp duty to deter cross-
border investment (O’Rahilly, 2015; Liu, 2019). These 
measures have been criticized for being relatively ineffec-
tive and mainly just serving to send signals to the market 
to cool down sentiment (Liu, 2019).
2. Literature review
2.1. Asset price bubbles
Many studies have indicated market frictions as impor-
tant factors in causing price bubbles. Tirole (1982) and 
Allen et al. (1993) indicate that bubbles occur in a rational 
expectations equilibrium, in which agents are short-sale 
constrained and asymmetric information is present. Haru-
vy and Noussair (2006) and Heston et al. (2007) state that 
when the ability of traders to speculate over the expec-
tation of falling prices is constrained, the influence of 
optimistic traders on housing prices is relatively strong. 
Malpezzi and Wachter (2002) and Mayer (2011) stress 
that, under market restrictions or a prolonged lag in sup-
ply, speculative activities over the boom and bust cycles 
of housing markets exert a relatively dominant influence 
on the volatility of housing prices and thereby may induce 
price bubbles.
Another view advocates that bubbles prevail in mar-
kets where agents’ trading motives are influenced by psy-
chological forces. Minsky (1974) and Kindleberger and 
Aliber (2011) state that optimistic market sentiment pro-
pels excessive growth of bank credit and the use of lever-
age among individuals and businesses, thereby giving rise 
to speculative frenzy and market instability. Shiller (2005) 
and Case and Shiller (2003) stress that a speculative bub-
ble arises from social contagion combined with imperfect 
information transmission. News of price increases stirs up 
fervor, which heightens expectations of future price in-
creases and spreads among market participants through 
social interactions. The effects of precipitating factors 
are amplified via a self-perpetuating excitatory feedback 
mechanism. Hirshleifer et al. (2011) emphasize that public 
opinions and behavior spread via a process influenced by 
psychological biases that nurture herding and information 
cascades.
Another approach to explain bubbles is based on mod-
els in which investors have heterogeneous beliefs and face 
short-sale constraints. Morris (1996) and Werner (2018) 
exemplify that an investor with a short-sale constraint is 
willing to purchase an asset at a price exceeding his assess-
ment of the intrinsic value, in anticipation that the asset 
might be resold to a relatively more optimistic investor at 
an even higher price in the future. Harris and Raviv (1993) 
and Kandel and Pearson (1995) hypothesize that the dif-
ferences in opinion stem from different interpretations 
of public announcements relevant to the determination 
of the intrinsic value of an asset. Scheinkman and Xiong 
(2003) and Hong et al. (2006) present a model of trading 
in which heterogeneous beliefs are induced by overcon-
fidence.
2.2. Housing prices, fundamentals, and bubbles
Some studies on fundamental housing prices entail an as-
sessment of housing affordability that associates housing 
prices with income. Capozza et al. (2002), Case and Shiller 
(2003), and McCarthy and Peach (2004) use the price-to-
income ratio to evaluate whether housing is available to 
the typical household. Another measure of housing prices 
relative to fundamentals is the price-to-rent ratio. Quigley 
and Raphael (2004), Sinai and Souleles (2005), Campbell 
et al. (2011), and Ambrose et al. (2013) employ the price-
to-rent benchmark to estimate whether housing markets 
are fairly valued. This ratio compares the costs of home-
ownership with the costs of renting a similar house.
Measuring owner-occupied housing costs requires 
consideration of both the consumption and investment 
factors that influence housing behavior. Dougherty and 
Van Order (1982), Muellbauer and Murphy (1997) and 
Himmelberg et al. (2005) estimate user costs of housing 
based on imputed rent on owner-occupied housing, ex-
pected capital appreciation in the prices of housing assets, 
and taxes on imputed rental income.
Housing prices also reflect distinctive features in in-
dividual markets. Davis and Palumbo (2008) and Wen 
and Goodman (2013) emphasize that the changes in 
property value are significantly affected by the propor-
tion of the overall property value made up by the land 
value. Gyourko et al. (2008) and Saiz (2010) confirm that 
construction costs, land use regulatory environments, and 
geographic restrictions affect housing supply elasticity and 
consequently influence housing prices.
Mankiw and Weil (1989) stress that demographic 
fluctuations induced by changes in age composition and 
household disposable income affect housing demand, 
which in turn influences housing prices. Maennig and 
Dust (2008), Saiz (2007), and Gonzalez and Ortega (2013) 
also provide evidence for the effects of population growth 
on housing demand.
Housing price bubbles are unobservable. Many re-
searchers employ the equilibrium prices derived from eco-
nomic models as benchmark values with which to compare 
realized housing prices and determine whether housing 
bubbles exist (for example, Case & Shiller, 2003; Hui & 
Shen, 2006; Mayer & Shiller, 2006; Costello et al., 2011). As 
Flood and Hodrick (1986) illustrate, this approach might 
be subject to model specification error. Luo et al. (2013) 
show that a framework encompassing model uncertainty 
induced by model misspecification can be analytically 
solved and mapped to a state-space representation.
Studies have made use of the state-space approach. For 
housing markets, Xiao and Tan (2007) employ Kalman fil-
tering to estimate a present value model in a state-space 
form. In their model, price bubbles are the residual term 
of their measurement equation. Teng et al. (2017) estimate 
housing price bubbles in a state-space representation, in 
which the residual term is further broken down into a 
bubble component and a non-bubble specification error 
component.
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3. Methodology and data description
3.1. The present-value model and housing price 
bubbles
This study adopts the methods of Black et al. (2006), Cos-
tello et al. (2011), and Teng et al. (2017). We approximate 
a formula for the present value of housing prices using a 
Taylor expansion series, and utilize the approximation as a 
basic component for a state-space representation of hous-
ing price dynamics.4 The model is described as follows:
1
1
1 
(1 )
t t t ii
i
t jj
P E D
∞
+
=
+
=
 
 
 =
 
Π +ρ 
 
∑ , (1)
where: tP  denotes the real house price at time t; 1tD +  
denotes the real rental income at time t+1; 1t+ρ  denotes 
the discount rate; tE  denotes expectations condition-
al on the information set used by market participants. 
Equation (1) is a particular solution to the equation:
1 1 1 ( ) / (1 )t t t tP E P D+ + += + +ρ (Black et  al., 2006; Teng 
et al., 2017).
Denote the log of  tP  and  tD  as  tp  and dt, repec-
tively, and the log of housing price-to-rent ratio, ( )t tp d− , 
as tπ . By taking log of both sides of the equation, apply-
ing the First-order Taylor’s approximation and performing 
repeated substitution, Black et  al. (2006), Costello et  al. 
(2011) and Teng et  al. (2017) illustrate that tπ  can be 
specified as follows:
1 1
1 1
0 0(1 )
j j
t t t j t t j
j j
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+ +
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= =
− θ
π = + λ ⋅ ∆ − λ ⋅
− λ ∑ ∑ , (2)
where: 1 1t j t j t jd d d+ + + + +∆ ≡ − ; 1t jf + +  is the time-var-
ying real risk-free rate; θ is the constant real risk pre-
mium5; λ  and k  are linearization constants given by 
1/ (1 exp( ))λ = + η  and ln (1 )k = − λ − −λ η  in which η  
denotes the sample mean of time series { }t td p−  around 
which the linearlization was taken.
Following Black et  al. (2006), Costello et  al. (2011), 
and Teng et al. (2017), this study estimates a three-variable 
vector autoregression (VAR) in ( , , )t t t tF d f= π ∆  to obtain 
the empirical counterparts of the forecasts for future real 
rent growths and risk-free rates. We then plug these fore-
cast values into Equation (3) to generate the log of funda-
mental price-to-rent ratio, t∗π .
4 For the details of the models, please refer to Costello et  al. 
(2011) and Teng et al. (2017).
5 According to Costello et  al. (2011), the real required return 
can be broken down into a time-varying real risk-free rate and 
a constant real risk premium. We use the historical premium 
approach of Koller et al. (2015) to estimate real risk premium 
for each month, where actual real returns from investing in 
housing market are compared to the real risk-free rate. We 
then calculate θ as the arithmetic average of monthly risk pre-
mium over the sample period.
The fundamental housing price, defined as the product 
of the fundamental price-to-rent ratio and the real rental 
income, can be described as:
*f
t t tp d= π + , (3)
where: ftp  is the logarithm of the fundamental housing 
price. When the possible misalignment of the housing 
price from the fundamental price is taken into account, 
we can formulate the housing price as:
f
t t t tp p B= + + υ , (4)
where: tB  denotes a price bubble; tυ  is a zero-mean, 
serially-uncorrelated noise. By construction, Equation (4) 
permits a rational bubble and a purely random deviation 
from the fundamental price.
The price bubble is an unobservable variable. To esti-
mate the unobserved bubble, this study adopts the mod-
elling framework of Teng et al. (2017), which relaxes the 
coefficient assumption in Equation (4) and models the 
housing price, fundamental price, and the bubble in a 
state-space form representation as:
*
1 2t t t t tp c c d B= ⋅π + ⋅ + + ζ , 2. . . (0, )t i i d N ζζ ∼ σ ; (5)
1t t tB B −= ψ ⋅ + ν , 2. . . (0, )t i i d N νν ∼ σ ,  (6)
where: tζ  and tν  are serially uncorrelated errors, with 
( ) 0tE ζ = , 2( )tVar ζζ = σ , ( ) 0tE ν = , 2( )tVar νν = σ , and 
( ) 0t tE ζ ν = . The inclusion of tζ  and tν  permits the 
housing price, tp , and the price bubble, tB , to be charac-
terized as stochastic processes.
This study employs the Kalman filter algorithm and 
the maximum likelihood method to obtain the estimates 
of the parameters in the equations (Schweppe, 1965; 
Harvey, 1989). Kalman filtering is an efficient recursive 
method for producing statistical optimal estimates in the 
state-space model. Combined with Kalman filtering, state-
space modelling permits researchers to obtain simultane-
ously unbiased, consistent estimates of both the model 
coefficients and the unobserved state variables (Harvey, 
1989; Hamilton, 1994).
3.2. Granger causality tests among bubbles
This study conducts the causality tests in the context of 
a vector error correction model (VECM), in which the 
equation for housing tier i is:
, ,1, 1, ,2, 2,
1 1
, , , 1 ,
1
... ,
Q Q
i t i q t q i q t q
q q
Q
i N q N t q i t i t
q
B B B
B ECT
− −
= =
− −
=
∆ = β ∆ + β ∆ +
+ β ∆ +α + ε
∑ ∑
∑
 (7)
where: ∆  denotes the first-difference operator; ,i tB  de-
notes the price bubble in housing tier i at time t for i = 1, 
…, N, 1 0 1 1 2 2t t t N NtETC a a B a B a B− = + + + + ; ,i tε  is a 
white noise disturbance.
If the past values of ,j tB∆  contain information use-
ful in forecasting ,i tB∆ , where j i≠ , then ,j tB∆  Granger 
causes ,i tB∆ . The Granger causality indicates that the 
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changes in the bubble in housing tier j lead the changes 
in the bubble in housing tier i. If the coefficients of lagged 
values of ,j tB∆  are jointly significantly different from 
zero, then there is evidence that price bubbles in hous-
ing tier j spread to housing tier i in the short run. ECTt-1 
is the last period’s deviation from the long-run equilib-
rium relationship among the N housing tiers. Coefficient 
iα  describes the speed at which housing tier i returns to 
equilibrium after a change in the other housing tiers. If 
coefficient iα  is statistically different from zero and the 
sign of the estimated value of iα  indicates that the bubble 
in housing tier i adjusts towards the long-run equilibrium 
relationship, then the bubble in housing tier i follows the 
long-run equilibrium relationship. As such, there is evi-
dence for the spreading of price bubbles from other hous-
ing tiers to housing tier i in the long run.
3.3. Generalized measurement of bubble spillovers
To assess the directions and the levels of bubble spillo-
vers among housing tiers, this study employs the spillover 
measurement approach developed by Diebold and Yilmaz 
(2012, 2014). Under this framework, various aspects of 
spillovers are evaluated, including total spillovers, direc-
tional spillovers, and pairwise spillovers.
Denote ( )wij Hγ  as the order-invariant, generalized 
forecast error variance decomposition of Pesaran and Shin 
(1998) at horizon H as below:
1
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γ =
Σ
∑
∑
, , 1,..., .i j N= ,  (8)
where: ie  is a unit vector, with the ith entry set to one 
and zeros elsewhere; hM  is an N N×  coefficient matrix, 
which multiplies the h-lagged error vector in the infinite 
moving average representation of an N-variable VECM 
model; Σ  is the covariance matrix of the error vector in 
VECM; jjσ  is the jth diagonal element of Σ . The ( )wij Hγ  
evaluates the share of H-period-ahead forecast error varia-
tion in the price bubbles of housing tier i that is attributed 
to shocks from the price bubbles of housing tier j.
Since the contributions to the variances of forecast er-
rors do not necessarily sum to unity, Diebold and Yilmaz 
(2012, 2014) standardize the variance decomposition to 
characterize spillovers as:
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Pairwise spillovers from j to i are measured as:
( ) ( )wi j ijC H H← = γ .  (10)
Net pairwise spillovers are measured as:
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Equation (12) reflects the difference between the bub-
ble shocks transmitted from housing tier j  to i  and the 
bubble shocks transmitted from housing tier i  to j .
Directional spillovers from all others to i are measured 
as:
1
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Equation (13) measures the shares of bubble shocks 
received from all other housing tiers in the total error 
variance of price bubbles of housing tier i.
Total spillovers are measured as:
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Equation (14) measures the system-wide spillovers of 
price bubbles among housing tiers. It provides an overall 
description of the degree of system connectedness among 
housing tiers.
3.4. Data description
This study obtains data on indices of housing prices and 
rents in Hong Kong from the Hong Kong government and 
data on Hong Kong three-month Treasury bill rates from 
the Datastream. The data are of monthly frequency and 
from January 1999 to May 2017.6 Three-month Treasury 
bill rates represent risk-free rates. All raw data are deflated 
by the Hong Kong consumer price index taken from the 
Datastream to obtain real indices of housing prices and 
rental prices as well as real T-bill rates.
Housing units are classified into tiers, in accordance 
with the Rating and Valuation Department, the HKSAR 
government. Specifically, the housing units are catego-
rized into Tiers A, B, C, and D , with saleable area of less 
than 40 square meters, 40 to 69.9 square meters, 70 to 
99.9 square meters, and 100 square meters or above, re-
spectively.7 According to market practice, Tiers A to C 
6 In addition to data availability, the period allows the investiga-
tion to be immune to the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis and 
the 1997 handover of Hong Kong.
7 Tier D in this study merges tiers officially defined as tiers D 
and E due to low transaction volumes of tier E housing units 
in some months.
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are regarded as mass residential properties, and Tier D is 
luxury residential properties.
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests of unit roots in-
dicate that the growth rates of real rental prices ( )td∆ , 
the log price-rent ratio series ( )tπ , and the real risk-free 
rates ( )tf  are stationary. The results support this study 
to estimate a three-variable VAR ( , , )t t td fπ ∆  to obtain 
forecasts for real rent growths and real risk-free rates and 
subsequently to use the forecasts for computing the fun-
damental price-rent ratios.
4. Empirical results and discussion
4.1. Bubbles estimated from the state-space model
Table 1 presents the estimations of the state-space models. 
For all four tiers of housing, the fundamental price-to-rent 
ratio, t∗π , and the rent variable, td , have significant, posi-
tive coefficients at or below the 5% level. The results in-
dicate that the housing prices significantly correlate with 
the fundamental price-to-rent ratios and positively relate to 
the rental values. The coefficient of lagged bubble 1tB − , is 
significant in each housing tier, implying high persistence 
in the driving processes of bubble series. Figure 1 plots the 
housing price bubbles of the four housing tiers. Similar to 
the studies on the Australia market by Costello et al. (2011) 
and the Taiwan market by Teng et  al. (2017), this study 
finds both negative and positive bubbles in Hong Kong.
Panel A of Table  2 exhibits the augmented Dickey-
Fuller test results of the bubbles. In each tier, the test sta-
tistics for bubble-level series are not significant at any con-
ventional level, while those for the changes of bubble se-
ries are significant at the 1% level. The results clearly show 
that all series of bubbles are I(1) processes. Given the unit 
root test results, this study proceeds to examine whether 
bubble series are cointegrated. Panel B of Table 2 reports 
Johansen’s (1988) cointegration test results. Both the trace 
statistics and maximum eigenvalue statistics reject the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration at the 1% significance level. 
The results indicate that the price bubbles in all tiers are 
linked together in the long run, implying that they spread 
across quality-tier markets in Hong Kong in the long run.
4.2. Granger causalities among the bubbles
As the bubbles are cointegrated, this study constructs 
VECM to examine their lead-lag relationships. Table  3 
presents the estimation results. In Panel A, for the equa-
tions of Tiers C and D, the error correction terms (ECTs) 
have statistically significant coefficients, and the signs of 
the ECT coefficients indicate that Tiers C and D adjust 
towards the long-run equilibrium relationship. These re-
sults support the existence of long-run Granger causality 
of bubbles from Tiers A and B to Tiers C and D. Lagged 
bubbles in Tier B (DBubble_B) have statistically signifi-
cant coefficients in the equations of the other three tiers. 
Table 1. Estimation results of the state-space model
1 2t t t t tp c c d B∗= π + + + ζ ; 1t t tB B −= ψ +ν
c1 c2 ψ
Tier A 0.178*** 1.004*** 0.999***
Tier B 0.219*** 1.008*** 0.994***
Tier C 0.237*** 1.001*** 0.992***
Tier D 0.177** 1.000*** 0.999***
Notes: t∗π  is the fundamental price-to-rent ratio. tp , td , and tB  are 
the log real house prices, log real rent, and price bubble, respectively. 
tζ and tν  are error terms. Consistent with Diba and Grossman (1988), 
Costello et al. (2011), and Teng et al. (2017), the value of parameter ψ is 
set to be less than or equal to one so that the house prices do not contain 
explosive bubbles. The symbols *** and ** denote significance at 1% and 
5% levels, respectively.
Figure 1. House price bubbles
Table 2. Unit root and cointegration tests of house price bubbles
Panel A: The augmented Dickey-Fuller test results
Level Difference
Bubble_A 0.451 –12.121***
Bubble_B 0.299 –11.827***
Bubble_C 0.024 –13.770***
Bubble_D –0.277 –11.536***
Panel B: The Johansen cointegration test results
Hypothesized No. 
of CE(s)
Trace Statistic Max-Eigen Statistic
None 75.015*** 44.181***
At most 1 30.834 18.524
At most 2 12.310 10.378
Notes: Bubble_A, Bubble_B, Bubble_C, and Bubble_D are the house 
price bubbles of Tier A, Tier B, Tier C, and Tier D, respectively. No. of 
CE(s) denotes the number of cointegration vectors. The symbols *** and 
** denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
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The results imply that bubbles in Tier B Granger-cause 
bubbles in Tiers A, C, and D in the short run. Lagged bub-
bles in Tier D (DBubble_D) have a significant coefficient 
in the equation of Tier C, but not in the other equations. 
This result shows that bubbles in Tier D Granger-cause 
only bubbles in Tier C, but not the bubbles in the other 
tiers in the short run.
The bursting of price bubbles in the third quarter of 
2008, as shown in Figure 1, reveals a possible structur-
al break on VECM caused by the global financial crisis 
(GFC). The conjecture is confirmed by the results of the 
sample-split Chow test for multivariate models introduced 
by Candelon and Lütkepohl (2001). The statistic of the 
test is significant at the 1% level based on 100,000 boot-
strapped iterations. Consequently, we construct and report 
separate VECMs in Panel B for the pre-GFC and the GFC 
period ending in November 2008 and in Panel C for the 
post-GFC period starting from December 2008.8 The re-
sults show different causal relationships among housing 
tiers, both in the long run and the short run, for the two 
sub-sample periods.
For the pre-GFC and the GFC period, the coefficients 
of ECTs are statistically significant only in the Tier B and 
8 The empirical results are qualitatively similar when the pre- 
and during GFC period ends in October 2008 and the post-
GFC period starts from November 2008.
Tier C equations. Specifically, only bubbles in Tiers B and 
C adjust back to the long-run equilibrium, and therefore 
the long-run Granger causality of bubbles runs from Tiers 
A and D to Tiers B and C. As to the short-run causality, 
similar results are obtained as those for the full sample 
period. The coefficients of lagged DBubble_B are signifi-
cant in the equations for predicting bubbles in Tiers A, 
C, and D. However, in contrast to that for the full sample 
period, lagged DBubble_D does not have any significant 
coefficient in any equation. This result implies that bubbles 
in Tier D do not Granger-cause bubbles in any other tier 
in the short run.
For the post-GFC period, only bubbles in Tier D sig-
nificantly adjust back to the long-run equilibrium, as ECT 
in the Tier D equation has a significant and positive co-
efficient. On the other hand, the significant and positive 
coefficient for ECT in the Tier C equation indicates that 
bubbles in Tier C do not adjust themselves back to the 
equilibrium, because in the cointegration equation from 
which ECT is calculated, the coefficient of Tier C is posi-
tive. The results imply that long-run causal relationships 
run from Tiers A, B, and C to Tier D in the post-GFC 
period. As to the short-run causalities, lagged bubbles 
in Tier A (DBubble_A) have significant coefficients in 
the equations of Tiers C and D, lagged bubbles in Tier 
C (DBubble_C) have a significant coefficient in Tier C 
Table 3. The vector error correction model of house price bubbles
Lagged
DBubble_A
Lagged
DBubble_B
Lagged
DBubble_C
Lagged
DBubble_D
Error
Correction term
Panel A: For the full sample period
DBubble_A –0.170 0.446*** 0.055 0.022 –0.000
DBubble_B 0.153 0.009 0.077 0.071 0.000
DBubble_C 0.064 0.457*** –0.194 0.193** –0.004***
DBubble_D 0.080 0.344*** 0.051 0.004 0.004***
Panel B: For the pre-GFC and GFC period
DBubble_A –0.284** 0.552*** 0.118 0.003 –0.002
DBubble_B 0.099 –0.034 0.191 0.040 –0.004**
DBubble_C –0.044 0.537*** –0.062 0.082 –0.009***
DBubble_D –0.007 0.397*** 0.132 –0.009 0.001
Panel C: For the post-GFC period
DBubble_A 0.023 0.283 –0.031 0.254** –0.001
DBubble_B 0.254 –0.062 –0.100 0.155 0.001
DBubble_C 0.564*** –0.175 –0.450*** 0.328*** 0.003***
DBubble_D 0.384*** –0.176 –0.039 0.150 0.006***
Chow Test for VECM
Sample Split test      207.26
bootstrapped p-value   (0.000)
Notes: DBubble_A, DBubble_B, DBubble_C, and DBubble_D are the first differences in log house price bubbles of Tier A, Tier B, Tier C, and Tier D, 
respectively. For the full sample period, the error correction term is 2.37 - 13.856*Bubble_A + 2.586* Bubble_B + 70.168*Bubble_C - 52.231* Bubble_D. 
For the pre-GFC period, the error correction term is 3.021 – 12.287*Bubble_A + 7.312* Bubble_B + 67.729*Bubble_C – 53.039* Bubble_D. For the 
post-GFC period, the error correction term is 15.200 +12.362*Bubble_A + 22.264* Bubble_B + 1.099*Bubble_C – 51.401* Bubble_D. The optimal 
length of the lags of the vector error correction model is selected based on the Schwarz’s Bayesian criterion. The symbols *** and ** denote significance 
at 1% and 5% levels, respectively. The whole sample is also split into two sub-periods (January 1999 to November 2008; December 2008 to May 2017). 
Bootstrapped p-value is obtained from 100,000 bootstrapped replications.
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equation, and lagged bubbles in Tier D (DBubble_D) have 
significant coefficients in the equations of Tiers A and C.
The above VECM results indicate that the bubbles in 
the luxury housing tier spread to the mass housing tier 
in the long run before and during the GFC, but the same 
spreading pattern occurs only in the short run after the 
GFC. On the other hand, the VECM results show that 
the bubbles in the mass housing tier spread to the luxury 
housing tier in the short run before and during the GFC 
as well as in both the short run and the long run after the 
GFC. The above findings answer the first and second re-
search questions. The results provide evidence that hous-
ing price bubbles do spread across quality tiers of housing 
market, and the spreading is not uni-directional from the 
luxury tier to the mass housing tier.
4.3. Generalized spillover measurement of bubbles
To further explore the dynamic inter-relationships among 
bubbles of different housing tiers, this study draws on the 
spillover measurement method of Diebold and Yilmaz 
(2012, 2014) to assess bubble spillovers. The analysis is 
conducted within the VECM framework with 12-step 
ahead forecasts. Total spillovers for the full sample pe-
riod are reported in the last row of Panel A of Table  4. 
As revealed by the total spillover index, the system-wide 
spillovers of bubbles among the four tiers of housing are 
high. Almost 67% of price bubbles in all four housing tiers 
come from spillovers. This figure indicates that inter-tier 
spillovers of housing bubbles are substantial and deserve 
serious investigation.
The second last column of Panel A reports the direc-
tional bubble spillovers from others to each of the four 
tiers. It describes the proportion of bubble shocks received 
from other tiers in the total variance of the forecast error 
for the price bubbles of each tier. As shown from Panel A, 
Tier D (71.2%) has the largest value in directional spillo-
vers of bubbles from others, followed by Tier C (70.8%) 
and Tier A (63.1%), and Tier B (60.4%) has the smallest. 
These numbers imply that Tier D is the most vulnerable 
to bubble shocks from the network interconnectedness of 
housing tiers.
The last column of the table reports the net pairwise 
bubble spillovers from Tier D to each of the other three 
tiers. It provides information about how much shocks aris-
ing in Tier D contribute to the forecast error variance of 
price bubbles in each of the other three tiers, in net terms. 
As seen from the table, the net pairwise spillovers from 
Tier D to Tier A, Tier B, and Tier C are –2.3%, –8.5%, 
and –4.0%, respectively. This result indicates that bubble 
spillovers from Tier D to Tier A, Tier B, or Tier C are 
smaller than that from each of the three tiers to Tier D.
Separate measurements over the pre-GFC and GFC 
period and the post-GFC period are reported in Panel B 
and Panel C, respectively. The values of total spillovers in 
the last rows of the two panels reveal that the four housing 
tiers are closely linked, with about 64–65% of the change 
in price bubbles being induced by the mutual impacts of 
Table 4. Spillovers of price bubbles among housing tiers in percentage
FROM
TO Tier A Tier B Tier C Tier D
Spillovers
from others
Net spillovers 
from Tier D
Panel A: For the full sample period
Tier A 36.9 30.0 17.7 15.4 63.1 –2.3
Tier B 24.4 39.6 19.6 16.4 60.4 –8.5
Tier C 20.2 26.0 29.2 24.6 70.8 –4.0
Tier D 17.7 24.9 28.6 28.8 71.2
Total spillovers = 66.4
Panel B: For the pre-GFC and GFC period
Tier A 39.6 28.6 11.1 20.7 60.4 3.6
Tier B 25.0 39.7 11.0 24.3 60.3 2.5
Tier C 19.6 22.2 20.4 37.8 79.6 19.3
Tier D 17.1 21.8 18.5 42.6 57.4
Total spillovers = 64.4
Panel C: For the post-GFC period
Tier A 40.2 28.3 13.5 18.0 59.8 –16.8
Tier B 33.3 46.5 12.1 8.1 53.5 –22.7
Tier C 31.8 27.6 30.8 9.8 69.2 –3.3
Tier D 34.8 30.8 13.1 21.3 78.7
Total spillovers = 65.3
Notes: The unit of the numbers in this table is the percentage. The ijth entry of the upper-left 4×4 submatrix is the percentage of contribution TO the 
variance of 12-month-ahead forecast error of tier i coming FROM shocks to tier j. The second farthest right column gives directional spillovers from 
all others to tier i. The rightmost column reports the values of pairwise spillovers from tier D to tier i minus pairwise spillovers from tier i to tier D.
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price bubbles in the four housing tiers. More important-
ly, the results from the two panels indicate that the two 
sub-periods again exhibit distinct patterns of directional 
spreading of bubbles.
For the pre-GFC and GFC period, the second last 
column of Panel B shows that the directional spillovers 
of bubbles from others to Tier C are the largest (79.6%), 
followed by those from others to Tier A (60.4%), Tier 
B (60.3%), and the smallest are from others to Tier D 
(57.4%). In other words, before and during the GFC, Tier 
D is the least vulnerable to bubble shocks spreading from 
other housing tiers. The last column of the panel shows 
that the net pairwise spillovers from Tier D are 3.6% to 
Tier A, 2.5% to Tier B, and 19.3% to Tier C, respectively. 
The characteristics of these values illustrate that bubble 
spillovers from Tier D to Tier A, Tier B, or Tier C are 
larger than that from each of these three tiers to Tier D.
As shown from the second last column of Panel C, 
during the post-GFC period, Tier D by contrast receives 
the highest directional spillovers from others (78.7%), 
followed by Tier C (69.2%), Tier A (59.8%), and Tier B 
(53.5%). This result indicates that, after the GFC, Tier D 
becomes the most vulnerable to bubble shocks spread-
ing from other housing tiers. The last column of Panel C 
shows that the net pairwise spillovers from Tier D to Tier 
A, Tier B, and Tier C are all negative at –16.8%, –22.7%, 
and –3.3%, respectively. These values illustrate that bub-
bles transmitted by Tier D to Tier A, B, or C are all smaller 
than those by each of these three tiers to Tier D.
The above findings yield evidence that answers the 
third research question. In the pre-GFC and GFC period, 
bubbles in the luxury housing tier have stronger spillover 
influences on bubbles in the mass housing tier than the 
other way around. However, in the post-GFC period, the 
opposite is true, i.e., the mass housing tier exerts stronger 
spillover impacts on bubbles in the luxury housing tier 
than vice versa.
To further confirm the above observations, this study 
investigates the dynamics and the continuance of the 
net pairwise spillovers from Tier D to each of the other 
three tiers, using 6-year, 7-year, 8-year, and 9-year rolling 
sample analyses (Diebold & Yilmaz, 2012, 2014; Gaspar, 
2012). Similar results are obtained, regardless of the size 
of the rolling window. For brevity, only the results from 
7-year rolling samples are presented here. Figure 2 plots 
the time series of the net pairwise spillovers. Clearly, the 
magnitudes of the net spillovers vary over time. This ob-
servation provides evidence that the relative strengths of 
the spillovers from the luxury market to the mass housing 
market are time varying.
Figure 2 confirms that the patterns of bubble spillovers 
before and during the GFC differ from that after the GFC. 
The net pairwise spillover effects of Tier D on either A, 
B, or C persist and remain positive before and during the 
GFC. The findings imply that the luxury tier is persistently 
a net transmitter of bubbles to the mass housing tier over 
this sub-period. However, after the GFC, the net pairwise 
directional spillovers from Tier D to either A, B, or C are 
negative most of the time. The results indicate that the 
luxury tier becomes a constant net receiver of bubbles 
from the mass housing tier during this sub-period.
Conclusions
The inter-tier spread of housing price bubbles is pivotal 
for the analysis of housing market risks. This study thus 
employs a state-space model to estimate price bubbles in 
housing quality tiers in Hong Kong. Based on the Granger 
causality test and the spillover measurement approach of 
Diebold and Yilmaz (2012, 2014), this study investigates 
the levels, directions, dynamics, and continuance of bub-
bles spreading across housing tiers.
The results of the analysis reveal a high degree of spread-
ing of price bubbles across housing quality tiers. However, 
contrary to the presumption of the cooling policies target-
ing top-tier luxury residential properties in Canada, Singa-
pore, Taiwan and the UK, the present study shows that the 
bubble spreading is not uni-directional from the luxury tier 
to the mass housing tier in Hong Kong.
This study also finds that the relative strengths of 
the spillovers from the luxury tier to the mass housing 
tier are time-varying in Hong Kong. Before and during 
the GFC, the luxury tier is persistently more influential 
than the mass housing tier in the transmission of bub-
ble shocks across housing market. Bubble shocks arising 
in the luxury tier have greater impacts on fluctuations of 
price bubbles in the mass housing tier than the other way 
around. However, after the GFC, the patterns of spillover 
Figure 2. Net bubble spillovers from D to each of the other 3 tiers
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effects reverse direction. During this sub-period, the mass 
housing tier persistently plays a much greater role than 
the luxury tier in generating bubble spillovers across the 
housing market. Movements of price bubbles in the luxury 
tier are affected more strongly by shocks occurring in the 
mass housing tier than the opposite.
These findings have important implications. For finan-
cial institutions and housing investors, taking into account 
the bubble spreading patterns allows them to be able to as-
sess more precisely the movements and the inter-tier rela-
tionships of price bubbles, manage lending risks better, and 
make more informed investment decisions. For government 
decision makers, considering the price bubble spillovers 
among housing tiers and the time-varying features enables 
them to better predict the effectiveness of housing policies 
aimed to address soaring housing price bubbles.
This study does not seek to identify the causes of the 
time-varying relative strengths of the spreading of housing 
bubbles. However, it worth mentioning some hypotheses 
about the possible causes. The findings for the pre-GFC 
and GFC period are consistent with the dominance of the 
cross-border capital inflow hypothesis. The hypothesis 
states that bubbles in the luxury housing tier drive bub-
bles in the mass housing tier, as luxury properties sold 
to wealthy non-local people at staggering prices are com-
monplace and receive much media attention. On the other 
hand, the findings for the post-GFC period are consistent 
with the argument of massive inflows of mainlanders as 
the main factor that exacerbates an insufficient housing 
supply and creates bubbles in the mass housing tier, which 
in turn creates bubbles in the luxury housing tier. Thus, it 
might be fruitful for future researchers to investigate the 
validity of these hypotheses.
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